Ann J. Sawyers v. Don M. Sawyers : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Ann J. Sawyers v. Don M. Sawyers : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce E. Hamberstone; Attorney for Respondent.
Don M. Sawyers.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sawyers v. Sawyers, No. 14461.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/310
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45,9 
.$9 
DOCKET NO. 
B R I E F ^ 
M ^^BmKBSKL W 9 
- \«r w I % | 
. SAWYERS, 
- VS"'" 
III! HIM II II, ! ! A W iii'I'IlllllllS, 
II THE SUPKKMI'! COURT 
STATE OP UTAH 
Plaint if f-Respondeii t:, 
Defendant-Appellant: 
Appel lant f» Brief: 
LA' 
Case No. 
14461 
Appeal from Order 
of tlhe Thi rd Judicial D i s t r i c t Court fc 
Don ¥, Tibbs, Judge, 
Torce of Both Parties 
^ake County, Honorable 
Bruce E. Hamberstone 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
1000 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Don M. Sawyers 
My own counsel 
3226 West 7980 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
F f!. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
<v 
1QAM 
m-
WW; 
%£•• 
1^' I 
ANN J . SAWYERS, 
- v s -
DON M. SAWYERS, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
14461 
Appellant's Brief 
Appeal from Order for Modification of Decree of Divorce of Both Parties 
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Don V. Tibbs, Judge* 
Don M. Sawyers 
My own counsel 
3226 West 7980 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Bruce E. Hamberstone 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
1000 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
£r* * " 
to*- " 
" « , ' • 
£*" '; 
fr: '•r i $v'" -
'vt 
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 1 
& ' . ' • ' 
p , V DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
p RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 1 
ft?;;; STATEMENT OF FACTS —— 2 
l i r : ARGUMENT 3 , 4 , 5 
&." CONCLUSION - 3 r 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANN J. SAWYERS 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DON M. SAWYERS 
Defendant-Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal for order from an order by the 
Honorable Don V, Tibbs, Judge of the Third District Court in 
a domestic case for modification of decree of divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court felt the defendant was a promoter 
and had plenty of money and was financially capable of giving 
the plaintiff anything she asked for based on her testimony. 
The court ignored income tax returns, depositions obtained from 
the sale of the truckstop, and ignored Internal Revenue Service 
reports and the defendant's CPA's testimony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks to have the order of the 31st 
day of October, 1975, completely dismissed, with the exception 
of paragraph five pertaining to the custody of the daughter, 
Mary Ann, and that the original decree of divorce dated the 
27th day of November, 1972, be reinstated and continue in effect. 
Case No. 
14461 
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The p l a i n t i f f ' s attorneys i.u».^;,uu J -rLerrogai'.* 
cast igate the defendant's financial capability and in each 
case found no substantial evidence to show an increase in -'• 
defendant's income. From October, 1974, to October, 1975, 
the p la in t i f f had served upon the defendant an-.«^ .rite!'* K 
orders to appear in court, pertaining to U4 * : ^ \-
i he defendant's CPA hab -."-.. scn.ed d .^'ale'nen . .-. ;:ie 
*i*Uinal Revenue Service showing a substantial loss on the sale 
of the truckstop previously owned by the defendant. The only 
financial gain received by the sale of the truckstop was a 
note for $94,000 paid to the defendant over a ten year period, 
which has now been levieq), the entire note, by the Internal 
Revenue Service unt i l the defendant has paid $25,795 93 in 
back taxes. Therefore, the defendant is not receiving any 
income from the note. The court based the defendant's total 
f inancial capabil i ty oi i th is particular note. When the order 
was actually made by the Court, the defendant was receiving 
$1400 per month. The defendants l i v ing expenses and debts 
exceeded $2100 per month. This was brought up at the t r i a l 
and ignored by the Court. 
i''lur selling uiu truckstop, the defendant entered 
the furniture business, doing business in Smith Me" Utah, 
Price, Utah, and Vernal, Utah. He has borrowed s u ^ U i -
amounts of money from financial inst i tut ions to keep U\. 
business going. The loss on the furniture stores at the ti;;(e 
of the order was approximately $40,000. The business is new 
and has continued to show no p ro f i t . At th is time, June, 1976, 
the defendant has sold out his business in Smithf i r ld, Utah and 
in Price, Utah, and has not yet recovered any o< t ie loss 
incurred. The defendant's CPA advises him tha+ ,ri *- ^ : r t 
approximately $60,000 at this tinu i, 
The Pla int i f f is wuikimi »n a IAIIIJOI teacher in 
Granite School Dis t r ic t and Is earning a salary of approximately 
$12,000 per year nfMi !»i<|iit n,o »HN<J years experience ii i I let 
present vocation. 
i t tne attorneys for the p la i n t i f f had dropped the 
< finding that there was no income for the defendant 
• r a v lal gain from the sale of the truckstop, which 
their depositions and interrogations showed, ih ie ivuld Iiave 
been considerably less attorney fees. They wuuM not take their 
finding for an answer and continued lo probe an'1 investigate the 
defendant by having him ordered to c-.-iri oc?-'ly --vfr ' month and 
accruing large attorne y fees. . 
i he defendant 1 las consistantly pa id c .1 » i Id support and 
alimony and has never refused such. ! I le de fei idant loves the 
children and is yery concerned with t l le it " we I fa re and wi l l 
continue to support and care for them, 1 loweve? , w i l l not be • •. 
forced to pay beyond ilis ab i l i t y . 
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\ i ) 
The court could see all paper work that this case 
consisted of and could see all court appearances, interrogations, 
acquisations, and investigations pertaining to the case and 
apparantly felt that there needed to be some decisions made 
at that time. The defendant believes they were made in haste. 
POINT I It is financially impossible for the defendant to pay 
all bills and expenses incurred bythe plaintiff which he is 
obligated to pay under the divorce decree within a period of 
ten days upon receipt of such bills or expenses. 
POINT II The defendant does not feel he should maintain a life 
insurance policy for teh plaintiff, especially when she has 
a life insurance policy furnished to her by her employer, 
Granite Education Association. The defendant is divorced from 
the plaintiff and has no ties or obligations to her. 
POINT III The defendant had Bill Sawyers, son of defendant, 
examinee! by his own dentist, who stated that the orthodonic 
work was not necessary. The defendant also had his attorney 
select an orthodonist to examine Bill Sawyers, who stated to the 
defendant on the telephone that it was a borderline case and 
that he did not know if the orthodonic work would help or not. 
the plaintiff took Bill Sawyers to an orthodonist who proceeded 
on the work without getting permission from the defendant, who has to 
pay the outrageous bill of approximately $1500. If the work 
was necessary, the defendant would not object to borrowing 
funds to have the work done. The defendant had the opinion of 
two dentists, Dr. Robert Wassam, Tooele, Utah, and Clair R. Hopkins, 
Jr. D.M.D., M. S., Orthodonics. However, at a later date, 
November 25, 1975, Dr. Hopkins sent a letter recomending that 
Bill Sawyers should be treated for the malocclusion by putting on 
braces and treating him orthodontal ly« This was after 
conversing with Dr. William Crockett about the case. The defendant's 
attorney was notified of this decision on February 23t 1976. 
So far, Bill has incurred over $1200 orthodonic treatment to 
this date, June 5, 1976, andthere has been no improvement on his 
over-bite condition. 
POINT IV The reason the defendant purchases clothes for the minor 
children is that usually when the children begin school, they 
have no school clothes and the plaintiff appears to not spend 
the child support money for the children's clothes. The minor 
children usually need clothes when they visit the defendant and 
he would like to purchase clothes because he feels they will not 
receive the clothes they need. 
POINT V The reason the daughter, Mary Ann, is living with the 
defendant is that the phsychiatrist, Dr. Merritt Egan, suggested 
to the Plaintiff that Mary Ann should live with the defendant 
with his present family. She has been living with the defendant 
since January, 1975, and is doing \/ery well. 
POINT VI The defendant does not object and has kept current on the 
child support. 
POINT VII The defendant should not pay the plaintiff $100 
per'month alimony as long as she is working as a school teacher 
and drawing a substantial salary. The defendant should not consider 
pavino $6,500 for an alimonv settlement. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I V All I ii ine aeTenaant is paying child support to the 
Salt""talurCounty Clerk. 
POINT IX The defendant does not agree to pay the plaintiff 
chfTcT~support while the minor children are spending summer vacations 
with the defendant. This would mean that when the children were 
spending six weeks vacation with the defendant he would be 
paying her $300 per month while the children are absent from 
her premises. 
POINT X The defendant feels he should maintain life insurance and 
has maintained such a policy, however does not feel he should 
maintain medical insurance as long as she works for the school 
district and they furnish a very good medical insurance for 
her dependants. The defendant has and will pay hospital and 
doctor bills not covered by her medical insurance. At present, 
there are two (2) medical policies on the children living with 
the plaintiff and it is felt by the defendant to be a waste of 
money. 
POINT XI The defendant does not agree with the visitation rights 
awarded to the plaintiff pertaining to Mary Ann visiting with the 
plaintiff on every third Thursday from 4:00 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. 
This interfers with her school work and the defendant cannot agree 
to this. The defendant does not agree with the visitation rights 
pertaining to the other children as well. 
The children should visit the defendant every other 
week beginning from approximately 5:00 P.M. Friday evening until 
10:00 P.M. Sunday evening. The defendant does not plan to interfer 
with the children's church meetings or activities. This means that if 
the children have and plan to attend church during Sunday, they are >/ 
with the defendant, he will be willing to return the children on 
Saturday by 10:00 P.M. The defendant feels this is reasonable. 
The defendant also feels that Mary Ann should have the same 
visitation opportunity with the plaintiff. This means that if 
she is planning to attend church on Sunday, the plaintiff 
should return her by 10:00 on Saturday. (P.M.) The defendant 
also feels that two weeks is not enough for the children to spend 
with their father and further requests at lease six weeks with 
his children during summer vacation. 
POINT XII The defendant will not agree to write a letter to 
notifythe children two weeks in advance to indicate the time he 
will take them for summer vacation. He will agree to notify the 
plaintiff by phone two weeks before he plans to take them for 
summer vacation. 
POINT XIII Agreed 
POINT XIV Agreed 
POINT XV Agreed 
POINT XVI The defendant disagrees. 
POINT XVII The defendant is in agreement to pay $300 in a 
cashier1'^ check for the reasonable attorney's fees instead of 
$750 over a long period of time. The defendant's attorney has 
already agreed to this and has already received a $300 
cashier's check. 
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POINT XVHI The defendant is not in agreement and is not v/illing 
to pay $!)78#00 that is claimed him owing for back or delinquent 
child support. This was ordered unfairly and 
the defendant was not delinquent any child support* According' 
to the original decree of divorce dated November 27, 1972, the 
defendant lived up to it 100% and paid child support according 
to that decree and when the court ordered him to pay $578 back 
child support it was ordered with no grounds and the defendant 
was not delinquent. 
POINT XIX The defendant disagrees on the basis of no grounds 
for the order. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it would be appropriate for this court 
to make the following order: 
The defendant asks the court to have the order of 
the 31st day of October, 1975, completely dismissed, with the 
exception of paragraph five pertaining to the custody of the 
daughter, Mary Ann, and that the original decree of divorce dated 
the 27th day of November, 1972, be reinstated and continue in 
effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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